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Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy
George P. Smith, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial scientific evidence indicates man's genetic inheritance
acts as a major influence not only upon his behavior but also upon his
health.' In the United States, for example, it is estimated that one out of
every twenty babies is born with a discernible genetic deficiency;2 of all
chronic diseases, between twenty and twenty-five per cent are predomi-
nantly genetic in origin.3 At least half of the hospital beds in America
are occupied by patients whose incapacities are known to be of a genetic
origin.4 Because modern medicine can alleviate the symptoms of some
genetic diseases through sophisticated treatment, many who are afflicted
and who would not have survived in the past now survive. Medicine is
unable to cure genetic defects;5 however, those afficted with genetic dis-
eases who are kept alive by modern technologies can reproduce and thus
may increase the number of defective genes in the gene pool.6
Considerable research into techniques for perfecting genetic engi-
neering has been undertaken in an attempt to develop new treatment for
* Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame University; Professor of Law, The Catholic Univer-
sity of America, Washington, D.C. B.S., J.D., Indiana University, LL.M. Columbia University.
During the summer of 1981, the author was a Visiting Scholar at The Lilly Library, Indiana Univer-
sity, Bloomington, Indiana, where he studied the papers of the late Professor Herman Muller, the
Nobel Laureate in Genetics. The research of that summer is utilized herein together with subse-
quent study undertaken by virtue of the author's Fulbright-Hays award in Australia as the Fulbright
Visiting Professor of Law and Medical Jurisprudence at The University of New South Wales, Syd-
ney, Australia, in 1984.
1. See S. STANLEY, THE NEW EVOLUTIONARY TIMETABLE (1981); T. DOBZHANSKY, GE-
NETIC DIVERSITY AND HUMAN EQUALITY (1973); Muller, The Human Future, in THE HUMANIST
FRAME 401 (J. Huxley ed. 1961); Muller, Human Values in Relation to Evolution, 127 SCIENCE 625-
29 (1958); Muller, Genetic Principles in Human Populations, 83 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 277
(1956); Muller, The Threads that Weave Evolution, 3 TRANSACTIONS, N.Y. ACADEMY SCIENCE,
117-25 (Series 11 1941); C. DARLINGTON, THE EVOLUTION OF MAN AND SOCIETY (1969).
2. Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 UCLA L. REV. 273, 291 (1968).
3. Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 487. Approximately 30,000 severely
defective infants are born each year and afflicted with grave handicapping conditions that range from
spina bifida to anencephaly. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J. LAW &
MED. 393 n.l (1981).
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw.
U.L. REV. 696-98 (1973).
6. Id. at 698.
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individuals with inherited diseases.7 Under the rubric of the "New Biol-
ogy," scientists are investigating and developing many interventions, in-
cluding gene deletion surgery, splicing and transplantation, cloning in
vitro or test tube fertilization, embryo implantation, parthenogenesis,
amniocentesis, and experimentation with the scope and application of
DNA.' Genetic engineering uses some of these procedures to reorganize
human genes to produce varied, particular characteristcs.9
To combat genetic disease, genetic engineering may, and frequently
does, rely upon eugenics, the science that deals with improving heredity.
Stated simply, a positive eugenics program seeks to develop superior
qualities in man through the propagation of his superior genes,10 and the
positive eugenists seek to produce a "new breed" with keener and more
creative intelligence.1 ' Conversely, a negative eugenics program at-
tempts only to eliminate genetic weaknesses. 2 When seen in application,
positive eugenics programs encourage the fit and "proper" individuals to
reproduce, while negative eugenics programs discourage those less fit and
those with inheritable diseases from procreating. 13 Abortion is one way
of implementing a program of negative eugenics after earlier attempts to
regulate have failed. 4
7. Kass, The New Biology.- What Price Relieving Man's Estate, 174 SCIENCE 779, 780 (1971).
See also C. HEINTZE, GENETIC ENGINEERING: MAN AND NATURE IN TRANSITION (1973); R.
BLANK, THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENETIC TECHNOLOGY passim (1983).
8. Symposium-Reflections on the New Biology, 15 UCLA L. REV. 267 (1968). Creative, sci-
entific impulses for research and investigation should be neither systemized nor controlled. "Some
part of life-perhaps the most important part-must be left to the spontaneous action of individual
impulse, for where all is system, there will be mental and spiritual death." B. RUSSELL, THE IM-
PACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY 89 (1952); see also R. BLANK, supra note7, 66 passim (1983).
9. Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 696; see also M. FRANKEL, GENETIC TECHNOLOGY:
PROMISES AND PROBLEMS (1973); Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1311 (1978).
10. See Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of
Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 222.
11. Frankel, The Specter of Eugenic, 57 COMMENTARY 25, 30 (1974).
12. Id. To be justifiable, the acceptance or rejection of eugenic policies should be based upon
more than one criterion. The following requisites should be a part of every eugenic program: scien-
tific validity (e.g., a demonstration of sufficient genetic variation to allow for selection of the attribute
in question); moral acceptability (i.e., a demonstration that the attributes chosen for selection are
properly considered socially desirable); and ethical acceptability (i.e., a demonstration that the pro-
grams needed to institute a eugenic program do not compromise individual rights and liberties pres-
ently sanctioned by both public policy and the law). See Lappe, Why Shouldn't We Have a Eugenic
Policy?, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 421, 425 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). See also Os-
born, Qualitative Aspects of Population Control Eugenics and Euthenics, 25 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 406 (1960).
13. Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly. Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 147 (1968).
14. T. DOBZHANSKY, MANKIND EVOLVING 245 (1962); M. HALLER, EUGENICS 3 (1963). See
also Green, Genetic Technology. Law and Policy/or the Brave New World, 48 IND. L.J. 559 (1973);
Dobzhansky, Comments on Genetic Evolution, 90 DAEDALUS 451, 470-73 (1961); STUDIES IN GE-
Genetics and Eugenics
The Yin and the Yang are the two great principles of Chinese Tao-
ism. Yin is the feminine, negative, and passive principle. Yang is the
masculine, positive, and active principle. At times they oppose, and at
other times they combine. If they are separated, no manifestation of any
kind is any longer possible. Man's health depends upon the harmonious
interaction of the Yin and the Yang. 5 The purpose of this essay is to
explore the extent to which Yin-Yang influences of relationships exist
within eugenics as a directive force in the science of genetics, and to test
the extent of their influence in modern family planning.
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Plato, in his Republic, idealized selective breeding as the foundation
for the creation and maintenance of a superior Guardian class.' 6 In his
1859 treatise, On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin, postulated a the-
ory of evolution based upon the natural selection of the fittest organisms
by virtue of their greater reproductive successes in the competitive strug-
gle for existence.' 7 Later, in Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to
Sex, Darwin suggested that man could profit if selective breeding tech-
niques were introduced into his reproductive cycle.' 8 It was his cousin,
Sir Francis Galton, however, who became recognized as the father of
eugenics.' 9 As early as 1869, Galton began to acknowledge that each
generation had the power and a coordinate responsibility to those who
followed to use its natural gifts in a way that would be advantageous to
future generations.2" Eugenics developed as a theory in 1883, and it was
later described as a scientific approach designed to give "the more suita-
ble races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over
the less suitable than they otherwise would have had."'"
First in Europe, and subsequently in the United States, social re-
formers and modernists seized upon Darwin's theory of evolution as a
NETICS-THE SELECTED PAPERS OF H.J. MULLER (1962); CLASSIC PAPERS IN GENETICS (J. Peters
ed. 1959); GENETICS, MEDICINE AND MAN (H. Muller, C. Little, L. Snyder eds. 1947); Tooley,
Abortion and Infanticide, 2 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (1972).
15. A DICTIONARY OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION 657 (S. Barndon, ed. 1970); 2 THE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 89 (P. Edwards, ed. 1967); DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
637 (W. Reese, ed. 1980).
16. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 166-70 (J. Davies & D. Vaughn trans. 1891).
17. C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
18. C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN 402-03 (1871).
19. Comment, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1850, 1852 (1981).
20. F. GALTON, HEREDITY GENIUS 1 (1869).
21. See Comment, supra note 19, at 1852.
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key to understanding the social disorganization of that period.22 Indeed,
this particular period of social evolution was compared with the very
evolution of an organism. Social Darwinists were formed as a group that
saw the decaying social order as the product of healthy competition
where only the fittest survived.23
The real honor of being the "father" of modern genetics was be-
stowed upon Gregor Mendel, an Austrian monk. In the 1860s, Mendel
began exhaustive experiments into inheritance factors which were later
designated as genes or units of heredity.24 Mendel discovered, through a
process of cross breeding peas, that a pair of determiners or genes was
the mechanism through which inherited traits were passed. Thus, if a
plant were to inherit a gene for round leaves from each parent, it would
have that specific trait. Yet, if a plant inherited one gene for sets of
round leaves and another gene for pointed leaves, the plant would exhibit
but one of those traits. The gene for the exhibited trait would be consid-
ered the dominant gene, while the other would be classified as recessive.
Recessive traits would appear only when a plant inherited two recessive
genes. Accordingly, a recessive trait could skip a generation, yet appear
in a later one. Using this data, Mendel developed a detailed system of
ratios which was used to predict the appearance of a trait.2 5
Although Mendel applied and validated his ratios only with peas,
the eugenists who followed Mendel applied these ratios to all species to
describe evolutionary genetics at a time when knowledge of the field was
quite primitive. Almost all of an individual's physical and psychological
characteristics were attributed to the presence of a gene for each specific
trait in his parent's reproductive or germ cells. There was much agree-
ment that common physical traits such as iris color, hair color, and skin
pigmentation were inherited. The eugenists extended this position by
maintaining that psychological traits such as sincerity or insincerity and
truthfulness or untruthfulness were also inherited.26
The noble ideals of positive eugenic programs sought to encourage
those with what were perceived as socially beneficial traits to consider
basic eugenic principles when choosing a marriage partner and deciding
family size. The negative program for eugenic improvement stressed
eradicating socially inadequate traits such as feeblemindedness from the
22. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell. Felt Necessities v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1416,
1420 (1981).
23. Id. See G. STINE, BIOSOCIAL GENETICS: HUMAN HEREDITY AND SOCIAL ISSUES (1977).
24. Id. at 1421. See also V. MCKUSICK, MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN (1978).
25. Stine, supra note 23, at 1422-25. See also J. FLETCHER, COPING WITH GENETIC DISOR-
DERS 3-32 (1982).
26. Stine, supra note 23, at 1422-25.
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American stock through legally sanctioned sterilization procedures.27
While the purposes and ideals of a positive eugenics program captured
the interest and imagination of many Americans, such a program never
developed.2"
In 1929, the following groups were determined to be "socially inade-
quate" and recognized as the target groups for sterilizations: the feeble-
minded; the insane (which included the psychopathic); the criminalistic
(including the delinquent and wayward); epileptics; inebriates (which in-
cludes drug habitues); the diseased (e.g., the tubercular, syphilitic, lep-
rous, and all others with chronic, infectious, and legally segregable
diseases); the blind and those with seriously impaired vision; the deaf and
those with seriously impaired hearing; the deformed (which included the
crippled); and dependents taken as orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless,
tramps and paupers.29 The stated goal of a number of the eugenists was
to build sufficient institutions so that by 1980, care could be extended to
the 1,500 feebleminded per 100,000 of the population which the eugenists
maintained would then be living in the United States.3"
By 1925, twenty-three states had enacted at least one piece of eu-
genic sterilization legislation. While varying classes of people were de-
clared to be subject to the laws, each law combined various degrees of
punitive, eugenic and therapeutic measures to effectuate its intent. 31 The
statutes were challenged on constitutional grounds. When a statute of
this type was determined to be unconstitutional, the decision was
founded on a denial of equal protection of the laws (i.e., invidious dis-
crimination against a class of citizens), a violation of due process or a
recognition that the sterilizations were cruel and unusual punishment.32
Although by 1931 thirty-two states had passed some type of sterili-
zation legislation, the full popularity of the eugenics movement had be-
gun to decline as early as 1927."3 Interestingly, during the 1920s,
scientific investigations began to show clearly that feeblemindedness was
not a direct consequence of Mendelian ratios, but rather the result of
very complex causes.34 Finally, in the 1930s, research in psychology, so-
ciology, and anthropology showed that environmental influences were
27. Id. at 1428.
28. Id. See also Beckwith, Social and Political Uses of Genetics in the United States: Past and
Present, 265 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 46 (1976).
29. H. LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATIONS 65 (1929).
30. Id. at 60. See also Lappe, Moral Obligations and the Fallacies ofGenetic Control, 33 THEO-
LOGICAL STUD. 411 (1972).
31. Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1433.
32. Id. at 1434.
33. Id. at 1454.
34. Id. at 1455.
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certainly as significant a determiner of human character and intelligence
as heredity.35 Equally as important, the passionate commitment of the
original leaders of the eugenics movement was not found to be replacea-
ble in the new converts, once the original leadership ranks were thinned
by death or retirement.36
III. IMPLEMENTING A NEGATIVE EUGENICS PROGRAM
To eliminate genetic weaknesses from society, a negative eugenics
program requires a determination of genetic composition. Genetic
screening and counseling accomplish this objective by identifying carriers
of genetic diseases and advising couples whether reproduction is biologi-
cally desirable.37 Screening and counseling may occur at both precon-
ceptual and postconceptual stages.3" A simple preconceptual screening
procedure consists of withdrawing and analyzing a blood sample to de-
termine if an individual possesses recessive traits for genetic disease.39
Postconceptual screening and counseling procedures are more compli-
cated medically and also pose more complex legal issues. Postconceptual
procedures are described below.
A. Amniocentesis
A recently developed postconceptual screening procedure, amni-
ocentesis, has emerged as a principal element of negative eugenic pro-
gramming. The procedure consists of inserting a needle through the
abdominal wall of a pregnant woman into the amniotic sac containing
the fetus, withdrawing a sample of amniotic fluid, and analyzing it.' Be-
cause the sac contains cells from different parts of the fetus, analysis of
this sample reveals the sex of the fetus and also whether it will be affected
by certain genetic disabilities.4 By permitting a physician to accurately
predict the presence of certain genetic defects, amniocentesis surpasses
standard genetic counseling procedures that must rely on probabilities.42
If amniocentesis reveals a genetically defective fetus, the parents
35. Id. at 1456.
36. Id. The four-part series by Daniel J. Kevles entitled, "Annals of Eugenics," appearing in
the October, 1984, issues of The New Yorker Magazine raises to a level of current consciousness the
issue of genetic improvement through the development and application of eugenic policies.
37. Davis, Ethical and Technical Aspects of Genetic Intervention, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 799
(1977). See also Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code. Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J.
697 (1976).
38. Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 700.
39. Id. See also Kobrin, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1283
(1983).
40. Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 487, 488 n.2.
41. Id.
42. Id. See Ransey, Screening. An Ethicist's View, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS
[Vol. 1985
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face the difficult choice of whether to abort the fetus. A couple informed
of a genetically defective fetus may decide for religious, personal, or ethi-
cal reasons that they want to allow the pregnancy to continue. Such a
choice raises the issue whether the child could bring a tort action against
his parents for wrongful life. Under current law, such a claim would
likely fail.43
B. Genetic Screening and Counseling Programs
Some of those currently involved with negative eugenics have em-
phasized the need for the application of traditional screening procedures
to identify the carriers of certain diseases." Certain leaders of Jewish
communities encourage citizens of their communities to participate in
screening to identify carriers of the Tay Sachs recessive gene, which can
cause a debilitating illness.45 Federal legislation permits the use of public
funds to establish voluntary genetic screening and counseling programs
for carriers of sickle cell anemia;46 some state legislatures have gone fur-
ther to require genetic screening of school age children for the trait.47
154 (B. Hilton, D. Callahan, M. Harris, P. Condliffe, B. Berkley eds. 1973); Lappe, Ethical and
Social Issues in Screening for Genetic Disease, 286 N. ENG. J. MED. 1129 (1972).
43. See Note, A Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58 (1970); Annot., 22
A.L.R. 3d 1441 (1968).
44. Rivers, Grave New World, SATURDAY REV., April 8, 1972, at 23, 26.
There are four areas in which genetic disease may be classified: single gene effects; chromo-
somal abnormalities; congenital malformation; and serious constitutional disorders. The incidence
of single gene effects--of which the most commonly know are phenlketonuria (P.K.U.), Tay-Sachs
disease, and X-linked mental retardation-is 11.2 affected births per 1,000 births. Chromosomal
abnormalities-which would include Down's Syndrome and Turner's Syndrome-account for 5.4
per 1,000 births. The incidence of congenital malformation is 14.1 per 1,000 births and the serious
constitutional disorders-which include diabetes and epilepsy-occur in 14.8 per 1,000 births. S.
HAYES & R. HAYES, MENTAL RETARDATION: LAW, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 28-29 (1982).
Usually within the first several weeks of pregnancy, between one-third and one-half of all zy-
gotes abort spontaneously owing to the fact that forty percent of the abortuses have an abnormal
chromosome complement. A rather surprising ninety-seven percent of Turner's Syndrome and
sixty-five to seventy percent of Down's Syndrome abort by the eighteenth week of pregnancy. Many
abnormal fetuses which do not abort spontaneously are identificable through the use of a variety of
techniques-with, in all cases, termination of the pregnancy being offered to the prospective parents.
S. HAYES & R. HAYES, id. G. RODERICK, MAN AND HEREDITY 225 (1968); S. SCHEINFELD, YOUR
HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT 189 (1965); H. PAPAZIAN, MODERN GENETICS 77 (1967).
45. Walters, Introduction to Genetic Intervention and Reproduction Technologies, in CONTEM-
PORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICs 567 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978); Nelson, Swint & Caskey,
An Economic Evaluation of a Genetic Screening Program for Tay-Sachs Disease, 30 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 160 (1978).
46. National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Diseases Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300b-l-300b-6 (1982). A. CERAMI & E. WASHINGTON, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA (1974). See
also A. ETzIONI, GENETIC FIx 132 (1973); Reilly, Government Support of Genetic Services, 25 So-
CIAL BIOLOGY 23 (1978); Culliton, Cooley's Anemia: Special Treatment for Another Ethnic Disease,
178 SCIENCE 593 (1972).
47. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 27-8.1 (1983) (exception for refusal of physical exami-
nation on religious grounds); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 15A (1983) (mandatory only if
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New York provides for premarital testing to identify carriers of the sickle
cell gene.4" Genetic screening programs also may include provisions for
counseling. 9 Unfortunately, counseling efforts to date have been spo-
radic and ineffective.5 If genetic screening programs are to have any
significant impact, more effective counseling techniques must be devised
and implemented.51
Public acceptance of mandatory genetic screening programs should
not be impossible to achieve. Premarital genetic screening would be a
simple addition to state statutes that already require premarital testing
for maternal rubella titre (although not itself considered to be a genetic
defect), blood group, and Rh status. 2 One scholar asserts that statutes
requiring genetic screening for the population at large would be a simple
and readily acceptable extension of present laws requiring vaccinations
and chest X-rays for school children. 3 Moreover, societal problems
child susceptible); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 904 (McKinney 1985) (exception for refusal based on reli-
gious beliefs). See also VA. CODE § 32.1-68 (1985) (voluntary screening program).
Dr. Linus Pauling has suggested that sickle cell anemia carriers be identified by tattooing the
forehead of every carrier. Other recessive genes, such as hemophilia and phenylketonuria, could be
similarly identified. Dr. Pauling wistfully suggests that such identification would discourage carriers
of the same defective gene "from falling in love with another" and, presumably, from procreating.
Pauling, Forward, Symposium-Reflections on the New Biology," 15 UCLA L. REV. 267, 270 (1968).
Limited neonatal screening for phenylketonuria (PKU)-a single gene effect that produces se-
vere mental retardation in children-was initiated in the United States and Britain during the 1950's.
Today, some forty-three states have PKU screening laws; another fourteen test neonatally for a
variety of screening problems other than PKU. Among such diseases may be listed: adenosine
deaminase deficiency; galactosemia; homocystinuria; sickle cell anemia; tyrosinemia; histidinemia;
branches chaisketonuriaa. Reilly, State Supported Mass Genetic Screening Programs, in GENETICS
AND THE LAW 159, 164 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
48. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW, § 13-aa (McKinney 1979). Other states provide for voluntary pre-
marital testing for sickle cell anemia. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 325-27 (West 1978);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-216 (1982).
49. See VA. CODE § 32.1-68 (1985). Antley, Variables in the Outcome of Genetic Counseling,
23 Soc. BIOLOGY 108 (1976). A genetic counselor "has freedom to persuade, according to his per-
sonal convictions, but he does not have freedom to coerce, based upon his inherent power in the
counseling milieu. He must accept the counselee as the ultimate decision maker. Different parents
have a variety of motives for their ultimate decisions. Thus, the outcome of their deliberations will
vary. And we will preserve our genetic heterogeneity." Shaw, Genetic Counseling, in HUMAN GE-
NETICS: READINGS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 200 (T. Mertons ed. 1975).
50. Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 701-02, nn.28-29. See also President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, Screening and Counseling for
Genetic Conditions: A Report on the Ethical, Social and Legal Implications of Genetic Screening,
Counseling, and Education Programs (1983); J. FLETCHER, COPING WITH GENETIC DISORDERS
50-74 (1982).
51. Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 701-02, nn.30-31. Confusion as to the significance of
possessing the defective gene not only renders screening programs less effective in discouraging re-
production, but the failure to differentiate between the disease and the trait also increase the stigma-
tization to which carriers are subjected. Id.
52. Frankel, supra note 11, at 29.
53. Id.
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such as population control, the cost of supporting the handicapped, and
the general welfare of the population favor the trend toward mandatory
genetic screening.54
Some legal scholars maintain that compulsory genetic screening
programs may be unconstitutional." They assert that the taking of a
child's blood sample would constitute a physical invasion of the body in
violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution and that a com-
pulsory counseling program would interfere with the fundamental rights
to marry and procreate.56 These critics also contend that a less intrusive
voluntary program, together with extensive dissemination of educational
material, could accomplish the same objectives.57 Although genetic
screening involves a minor intrusion into an individual's body and may
involve a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the
search is not unreasonable and prohibited if executed properly and justi-
fied by a legitimate state interest.58 Similarly, if mere screening and
counseling interfere with the right to procreate, such interference may be
justified by a compelling state interest which must be preserved. The
state's interest in improving the quality of a population's genetic pool in
order to minimize suffering, to reduce the number of economically de-
pendent persons, and possibly, to save mankind from extinction arguably
justifies the infringement of individuals' civil liberties.5 9
Unfortunately, voluntary programs seldom achieve their goals. Peo-
ple are too preoccupied with the daily vicissitudes of life to be concerned
with prospective occurrences of genetic possibilities. Therefore, although
a voluntary program concededly is less intrusive, the only way to achieve
positive, enduring results is to implement some form of mandatory ge-
netic screening program.6°
54. Id. While the United States Air Force Academy ended its ban on maintaining cadets at the
Academy who were carriers of sickle-cell anemia in 1981, it has been reported that some six or more
major American corporations endeavor to screen prospective employees for genetic deficiencies (and
particularly their sensitivity to toxic substances). In 1982, nearly five dozen other Fortune 500 firms
reported that within five years they, too, expected to follow a similar policy. "Hemophiliacs may not
have a right to employment as butchers; still, in some untold fraction of cases the burden of work-
place safety could well come to fall less on the company than on the employees-a circumstance that
would particularly affect ethnic or racial groups among whom the incidence of, say, thalassemia or
the sickle-cell trait is disproportionately high." Kevles, supra note 36, at 116, 117.
55. Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 712.
56. Id. at 711-12.
57. Id.
58. Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (compulsory blood test to determine
intoxication of automobile driver not unreasonable search).
59. Vukowich, supra note 10, at 208.
60. Pauling, supra note 47, at 270-71.
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C. Restrictions on Marriage
An even more effective means of preventing the birth of genetically
defective persons is to prohibit marriage between carriers of the same
genetic defect. Both constitutional and social objections have been raised
to such restrictions on marriage.6' Existing laws prohibiting marriage
for eugenic reasons and proposals to restrict marriage between carriers of
the same genetic defect are attacked as being excessively broad, and crit-
ics have suggested that only procreation needs to be regulated to ensure
eugenic preservation and responsible parents.62
Since procreation traditionally is set within the marriage frame-
work, however, establishing restrictions on marriage is the most practical
mechanism for implementing a negative eugenics program. Moreover,
married couples prohibited from procreation nonetheless might have
children accidentally or intentionally.63 Whether a state's pursuit of the
public's health and welfare would justify an abridgement of the funda-
mental right of marriage between carriers of the same genetic defect is
doubtful. Such restrictions also might prove ineffective at present due to
increasing tolerance of free love and common law (or de facto) relation-
ships. Thus, it is unlikely that restrictions on marriage would prove to be
an acceptable method of eugenic control.
D. Restrictions on Reproduction
Modern cases support the proposition that marital and procreative
decisions fall within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. 64 As
early as 1941, the United States Supreme Court declared that man pos-
sesses the basic civil right to have offspring.65 More recently, the Court
held that the choice of whether to give birth is within a constitutionaly
protected zone of privacy.66 These broad pronouncements, however, do
not force the conclusion that all restrictions on reproduction are per se
unconstitutional. If a state may prevent a person from marrying more
than one person at a time, should it not have the same power to prevent a
61. See Vukowich, supra note 10, at 215-16.
62. Id. at 216.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972) (forbidding-on morality
grounds-sale or gift of contraceptives to unmarried persons conflicts with fundamental constitu-
tional rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12 (1967) (state may not infringe freedom to marry
person of another race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965) (statute forbidding
use of contraceptives violates constitutionally protected right of marital privacy).
65. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). Concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut,
Justice Goldberg commented that a compulsory birth control law unjustifiably would abridge the
constitutional rights of marital privacy. 281 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Warren, C.J., Brennan, J.,
concurring).
66. See Roe v. Wade, 419 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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person from having more than one or two children? The right to procre-
ate may not include a right to breed without restrictions.67 Societal inter-
ests may be sufficiently powerful to justify at least some regulation of
reproduction.68
Some legal precedents uphold the constitutionality of eugenic sterili-
zation. In Buck v. Bell,69 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Virginia statute providing for sterilization of inmates of state-supported
institutions who were found to have a hereditary form of insanity or im-
becility." And still today, nearly half of the states have some form of
compulsory sterilization legislation,71 and the courts typically uphold the
validity of the statutes.72
The extension of Buck to sterilization of carriers of recessive defec-
tive genes could not be accomplished easily. Since its decision in that
case, the Court has increasingly recognized the right to marry and have
children as a basic or fundamental right, so that a state must show a
compelling interest in order to justify any abridgement of the right.7 3
67. M. Golding & N. Golding, Ethical and Value Issues in Population Limitation and Distribu-
tion in the United States, 24 VAND. L. REV. 495, 511 (1971).
68. Id. at 512. The authors conclude, however, that the unrestricted freedom to procreate
should be abridged only for a "good of momentous order." Id.
69. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
70. Id. at 207. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call on those who already sap the strength of
the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to
prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."
Id. See also In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
71. The present eugenic sterilization statutes are: CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1970); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901-3910 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
34B §§ 7001-17 (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.13 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1-
41-45-19 (1981 & Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-501-50-5-505 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 35-36-35-50 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 436.205-436.335 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10-44-
47-100 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1-64-10-16 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8701-16
(1968 & Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.9-54.325.15 (1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1-27-16-5
(1976). It has been estimated that over 70,000 people have been sterilized under such statutes. STA-
TISTICS FROM HUMAN BETTrERMENT ASS'N OF AMERICA, SUMMARY OF U.S. STERILIZATION
LAWS 2 (1958).
One should distinguish these eugenic sterilization statutes from those sterilization statutes
which are wholly voluntary in nature. Among the voluntary statutes are: OR. REV. STAT.
§ 435.305 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-14, 24-9-1 (1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-932 (1985);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-271-90-275 (1985). These statutes are essentially contraceptive and thera-
peutic and not eugenic in nature.
72. See, e.g., Oregon v. Cook, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972) (equal protec-
tion challenge based on indigency rejected); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712-721, 157 N.W.2d 171, 178
(1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 996 (1970). See also Dunn, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitu-
tional Re-evaluation, 14 J. FAM. L. 280 (1975).
73. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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Several factors indicate that the state interest in sterilization of carriers of
defective genes is not as compelling as it is with regard to mental incom-
petents. A mental incompetent may be unable to be an adequate parent,
and the burden of care therefore would fall upon the state.74 Moreover,
the sterilization of mental incompetents in institutions can benefit them
directly in that it "enable[s] those who otherwise must be kept confined
to be returned to the world . . . . " In making this statement, the
Court assumed that there is a strong likelihood that the child of an intel-
lectually defective mother would inherit the same defect.7 6 The Court's
assumption is not necessarily correct since the child of two heterozygous
individuals has only a one in four chance of exhibiting that defective
trait.
77
The distinguishing features of Buck v. Bell indicate that the state can
offer compelling justification to warrant mandatory restriction on repro-
duction. Such justifications include society's interest in the reduction of
human suffering and in safeguarding the health and welfare of its citizens
through the allocation of economic resources and through population
control.78 In Buck, Justice Holmes stressed that "[i]t is better for all the
world . . . if society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind."79 Perhaps world conditions have become so
74. Oregon v. Cook, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972).
75. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). The Court's rationale acquires additional signifi-
cance because it became the basis for distinguishing Buck in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma where
the Supreme Court invalidated a statute providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals. The
Court in Skinner concluded that the questioned statute violated the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1941).
76. The statute challenged in Buck required only that experience demonstrate heredity plays an
important role in the transmission of the mental defect. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206. The inmate in-
volved, however, was the daughter of a feebleminded mother. Id. at 205. See Murray, Marriage
Contracts for the Mentally Retarded, 21 CATH. LAW. 182 (1975).
77. See Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 721 n.131.
78. Vukowich, supra note 10, at 208. A persuasive economic argument can be made for forced
sterilization of mentally defectives. A 1971 study undertaken by the United States government con-
cerned 190 public institutions for the mentally retarded and disclosed 15,370 patients were admitted
for treatment during the 1971 calendar year. This is the equivalent of 7.5 patients per 100,000
people in the overall population and represents an average daily resident patient population of
181,058. Even though this figure shows a slight decline from the peak year of 1968, during the same
four-year period, the annual cost of institutional care per patient rose from $3,472.00 to $5,537.00.
Stated otherwise, the costs rose from $9.00 per day to $15.00 per day which is a 66% increase.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 82, 83
(1974). See also Landam, The History of Human Sterilization in the United States: Theory, Statute
and Adjudication, 23 ILL. L. REV. 463 (1929); Baron, Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally Re-
tarded, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 267 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976); Rothman, Sterilizing
the Poor, 14 SOCIETY 36 (1977).
79. 274 U.S. at 207. Unrestricted genetic transmission forces a heavy burden upon society.
The Juke and Kallikak family histories reveal clearly this point. Max Juke resided in Ulster County,
New York. He had two sons who married two of six sisters of a local feebleminded family. One
other sister left the area; the other three married mental defectives. From these five sisters, 2,094
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complex and resources so valuable that society now has a compelling
interest in restricting reproduction by those who, although not "mani-
festly unfit" themselves, perpetuate human suffering by giving birth to
genetically defective offspring.
IV. THE NEW BIOLOGY AND A PROGRAM TO POSITIVE EUGENICS
A. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination, referred to as AID or heterologous insemi-
nation, is the process of inseminating a woman with the sperm of a do-
nor. Although AID was developed to provide a child to a married
couple that could not reproduce due to a physical impediment of the
husband, the method today is also used in positive eugenics programs.80
Sperm banks have been established to maintain semen of "distinguished"
persons even beyond their lifetimes.8" Positive eugenists advocate use of
direct descendants and 726 consortium descendants were traced by 1915 into fourteen states. All of
them were feebleminded and the cost to society from their welfare payments, illicit enterprises, jail
terms, and prostitution brothels was $2,516,685.00. J. WALLIN, MENTAL DEFICIENCY 43-44
(1956). Martin Kallikak, Sr., fostered a son, Martin Jr., by a feebleminded girl during the Revolu-
tionary War. Martin Jr. married a feebleminded girl and they, in turn, had seven children: five of
whom were similarly afflicted. From these progeny sprung 480 descendants, 143 feebleminded, 46
normals, and 291 of unknown mental stature. When Martin Sr. returned from the War, he married
a normal woman and started a line culminating in 496 descendants-all of whom were normal. Id.
at 44-45. Environmental deprivation has been recognized by some as an important, if not the deter-
mining, factor in the Kallikak "saga."
Various estimates have been made relative to the lifetime costs of various genetic diseases-
often with rather astonishing results. For example, it has been calculated that the lifetime costs of
maintaining a seriously defective individual is $250,000.00; this assumes, of course, institutionaliza-
tion. Conservative estimates place the number of new cases of Down's syndrome in the United
States at 5,000 each year--or, one in every 700 live births. Using the $250,000.000 figure for the cost
of maintenance, the lifetime committed expenditure for new cases of Down's syndrome standing
alone comes to at least $1.25 billion yearly which is, admittedly, a staggering figure for but one
disease entity.
Another way of calculating the toll of genetic disease is to estimate the future life years cost.
One widely cited estimate indicates that some 36 million future life years are lost in the United States
by birth defects-putting the figure for recognized genetic disease (80% of birth defects being genetic
in whole or in part) at 29 million future life years lost, or several times as much as from heart
disease, cancer and stroke. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, WHAT ARE THE
FACTS ABOUT GENETIC DISEASE? (Public Health Service, N.I.H., DHEW Pub. No. (NIH) 75-370)
(1978). See also M. FRANKEL, GENETIC TECHNOLOGY: PROMISES AND PROBLEMS 46-77 (1973);
R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (1976); G. HARDIN, NATURE
AND MAN'S FATE (1959).
80. Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly. Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127 at 148 (1968). It is generally agreed that it is best for any AID baby not to know of its
origins. The donor should not be told if his donation of semen resulted in a successful impregnation
and birth. Attalah, Report from a Test Tube Baby, N.Y. TIMES MAG., April 18, 1976, 16-17, 51.
81. Smith, supra note 80, at 145-46. In 1979, the Repository for Germinal Choice became
operational in Escondido, California, and is designed to make available the sperm of Nobel Prize
winners and other "creative, intelligent people." Playboy Interview: William Shockley, PLAYBOY
Aug. 1980, at 69. See also Broad, A Bank for Nobel Sperm, 207 SCIENCE 1326 (1980).
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superior sperm banks to develop the population's genetic strength and to
assure the survival of the human race.82 The ultimate goal of positive
eugenics is to assure eutelegenesis, mass insemination with superior
sperm.83
The word "eutelegenesis" was first proposed by Marion Piddington
in 1916 "as a means of populating Australia and creating a race combin-
ing high moral worth with sound physical development," and was used
subsequently by early American eugenists8 4 The use of AID practices to
implement a positive eugenics program should encounter little resistance
because these practices infringe upon individual rights only minimally,
neither restricting nor prohibiting marriage or reproduction.85 Of
course, there are varying ethical and moral issues associated with this
practice by unmarried women. 6
B. In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Implants
In 1974, Dr. Douglas Bevis of Leeds University announced that out
of thirty attempts to conceive human embryos in vitro, or in test tubes,
and then implant them in utero, or into the wombs of women, he had
achieved three implants that resulted in the births of three babies.87 The
three mothers had been infertile because of diseased, blocked, or missing
Fallopian tubes. Dr. Bevis removed ova from each woman, fertilized the
ova in the test tubes with sperm from the women's respective husbands,
and then implanted the fertilized eggs into the women's wombs.8 8 Be-
cause he was unwilling to fully document his research, Dr. Bevis's an-
nouncement was doubted considerably. 9 Dr. Patrick Steptoe, a British
gynecologist, and Dr. Robert Edwards, a Cambridge University physiol-
ogist, documented the laboratory conception of a test tube baby and its
birth in 1978.90
In Australia, Dr. Carl Wood of Monash University and the Queen
Victoria Medical Centre in Melbourne has gained worldwide credit for
perfecting and advancing in vitro fertilization techniques, and for utiliz-
82. Smith, supra note 80, at 145-46.
83. Id. See also S. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVE (1968); Medawar, The Genetic
Improvement of Man, 4 AUSTRALASIAN ANNALS OF MED. 317 (1969).
84. Brewer, Eutelegenesis, 27 EUGENICS REV. 121, 123, 126 (1935). See also Smith, The Ra-
zor's Edge ofHuman Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers,, 4 W. N. ENG. L. REV. 639
(1983).
85. Vukowich, supra note 10, at 230-31.
86. Smith, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 263 (1984).
87. Rovrik, The Embryo Sweepstakes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 15, 1974, at 17.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. TIME, July 24, 1978, at 47.
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ing frozen embryos to combat infertility.9" The use of frozen embryos
raises a number of moral, ethical, and religious issues which are beyond
the scope and purpose of this essay.92 The use of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transplants in humans will increase until other means of con-
quering infertility are discovered or made available.
If a woman is infertile due to a blocked or missing Fallopian tube,
an ovum may be taken from one of her ovaries, fertilized in a test tube
with her husband's sperm (or a donor's sperm if her husband is infertile)
and implanted in her uterus. If a woman cannot produce normal egg
cells, a donor's egg, already fertilized by the husband's sperm through
artifical insemination or fertilized in vitro with the husband's sperm,
could be implanted into her uterus. 93 A woman who cannot carry a baby
to term because of a physical disability could enter into a contract with a
surrogate or host mother to do so, 9 4 and an egg fertilizer either in vitro or
in vivo could be implanted into the host mother. A healthy career wo-
man, such as a professional athlete, for example, may also seek the serv-
ices of a surrogate mother if she does not wish to miss valuable time from
her professional interests to carry a baby for the full term.95
Successful in vitro fertilization also may lead to the development of
in vitro gestation or complete development of a fetus outside the womb.9 6
Married couples could also rely on in vitro fertilization techniques to
91. See TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES (W. Waiters & P. Singer eds. 1982); Edwards & Steptoe, Current Statutes of
In Vitro Fertilization and Implantation of Human Embryos, THE LANCET, Dec. 3, 1983, at 1265;
Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 336
(1981).
92. MAKING BABIES: THE TEST TUBE AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (A Nichols & T. Hogan eds.
1984); Symposium, In Vitro Fertilization: The Major Issues, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 192 (1983). See also
Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medico Legal Aspects of a New Tech-
nique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1983); Walters, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Review
of the Ethical Literature, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (1979). See also H. & J. RIFKIN, WHO
SHOULD PLAY GOD? (1977).
93. Gaylin, We Have the Awful Knowledge to Make Exact Copies of Human Beings, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 1972, 11, at 48; Rorvik, supra note 87, at 50. See also R. McKINNEL, CLON-
ING: NUCLEAR TRANSPLANTATION IN AMPHIBIA (1978). Ova transplanting might be undertaken
for eugenic reasons similar to those prompting the use of AID. If it is the wife instead of the hus-
band whose germ cells are infertile or carry the threat of transmitting some serious X-linked genetic
condition, she can be implanted with eggs from a healthy donor. The results and the parentage
problems would then be analogous to those in cases of artificial insemination-with one important
difference: instead of the child of a couple not being the husband's genetically, the child in the ova
transplant cases would not be the wife's. P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 217
(1977).
94. See Gaylin, supra note 93, at 48; cf. Rorvik, supra note 85, at 50 (eggs from one cow can be
implanted in the womb of another).
95. Gaylin, supra note 93, at 48. See also R. SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY, ch. 8 (1981).
96. Id. See also Smith, Australia's Frozen Orphan Embryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical
Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985).
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have a child not even genetically their own. An unmarried person desir-
ing a child might wish to utilize these methods as well. Since an unmar-
ried individual would need a donor's egg or sperm to effectuate the
procedure, positive eugenics concepts could be used to create children
with a stronger genetic heritage.97 As in the case of AID programs, the
incorporation of positive eugenics concepts would infringe on individual
rights minimally because they neither restrict nor prohibit marriage or
reproduction, as eugenics programs do generally.
C. Asexual Reproduction: Cloning and Parthenogenesis
The word "cloning" which derives from a Greek root meaning cut-
ting, is generally defined as asexual propagation and is commonly used to
develop new varieties of plants.9" In 1966, a team of Oxford University
biologists, headed by Dr. John Gurdon, announced that they had grown
seven frogs from the intestinal cells of tadpoles. 99 What had been routine
in the garden, now existed for one group of animals: a new organism was
produced from a single parent.
Several steps would be required to clone a human. First, the nucleus
of a donor's egg cell would be destroyed. Second, a nucleus from any
convenient cell of the person to be cloned would be inserted into the
enucleated egg by microsurgical techniques which scientists today have
yet to develop. Third, the new cell, placed in a nutrient medium, would
begin to divide, and fourth, implantation of the embryo into the uterus
would follow in approximately four to six days."o The cloned individual
would be the identical twin of the person who contributed the body
cell.' °' The establishment of banks of tissue cultures would permit the
cloning of deceased persons.
Parthenogenesis, commonly referred to as virgin birth, is another
form of asexual reproduction.0 2 The French-American biologist, Jac-
ques Leob, achieved parthenogenesis in sea urchins in 1899.103 More re-
cently, scientists have reported laboratory parthenogenic experiments for
97. D. RORVIK, BRAVE NEW BABY 109 (1971).
98. G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 23-25 (1968). See Smith, Intimations of Im-
mortality. Clones, Cryons and the Law, 6 U.N.S. WALES L. REV. 119 (1983).
99. G. LEACH, THE BIOCRATS 94 (1970).
100. J. Watson, Potential Consequences of Experimentation with Human Eggs, Jan. 28, 1971
(Papers 1, 3, 4, Harv. Univ. Biological Labs). See also R. COWPER, CLONE (1972); Walters, Clon-
ing, Ectogenesis, and Hybrids: Things to Come, in TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUES-
TIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 110 (W. Walters & P. Singer eds. 1982).
101. Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution, 100 AM. NATURALIST 549, 562
(1966); Watson, Moving Toward the Clonal Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY at 50, 51 (May, 1971).
102. Comment, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of
the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476 (1974).
103. G. TAYLOR, supra note 98, at 29.
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frogs and mice.' 4 If this process is perfected for humans, a woman one
day may produce the necessary egg cell for conception, jolt the egg by
pulling an electric switch or administering a drug, thereby enabling it to
split, and then have it implanted in her womb for gestation and ultimate
birth-all without physical contact with man or with his sperm.
10 5
Not enough is known about human cloning or parthenogenesis to
raise concern about whether it should be undertaken. 106 Present medical
ethics require that a researcher be reasonably confident about the out-
come of his research, that he undertake research for reasonably humani-
tarian purposes, and that he obtain the informed consent of the research
subjects. 0 7 These factors do not determine whether cloning is proper. If
the rate of pollution of the human gene pool continues to increase
through uncontrolled sexual reproduction, however, efforts to produce
healthier people may be required to compensate for the increase in the
number of people afflicted with genetic diseases.' In that event, one
could make a strong ethical argument to justify cloning of healthy indi-
viduals on the ground that it could achieve the greatest good for the
greatest number of people. 10 9
Legislation that embodies positive eugenics concepts and permits
only individuals with superior genetic endowments to clone would raise a
serious constitutional issue. Such a statute would require safeguards
against the large scale cloning of particular types of individuals. To do
otherwise would decrease the genetic variation that is so vitally necessary
to natural selection and would even threaten man with his own extinc-
tion.l"° By discriminating between those with superior genetic traits and
all others, however, legislation of this nature would be subject to equal
protection challenges. Under standard equal protection analysis, if a
court determined that the statutes affected a fundamental right, the state
would need to show that the legislation served a compelling state inter-
est."' The right to procreate has been declared a fundamental right," 2
but the denial of cloning methods to individuals who are capable of re-
producing in the normal manner may not be a sufficient infringement of
104. Id. at 30.
105. D. RORVIK, supra note 97, at 95.
106. Id. at 94. See also Ingle, The Ethics of Biomedical Interventions, 13 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOL-
OGY & MED. 364 (1970).
107. Lederberg, Genetic Engineering or the Amelioration of Genetic Defect, 34 PHAROS 9, 12
(1971).
108. Id. at 12.
109. Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776, 779 (1971).
110. Id.
111. Comment, supra note 102, at 561.
112. Id. at 550, 556.
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this fundamental right to trigger the compelling interest requirement.113
If it were not such an infringement, the state would be required to show
only a rational relation between the legislation and a legitimate state in-
terest.'1 4 A court might determine that the state's interest in the propa-
gation of superior traits is constitutionally impermissible because it
violates the Constitution's nobility clause" 5 or the thirteenth amend-
ment's prohibition of involuntary servitude." 6 If a court determined
that the state has a legitimate interest in the propagation of superior
traits, it would probably go on to find that the legislation is rationally
related to that purpose.
Persons who carry genes for recessive traits might succeed in claim-
ing that permitting only genetically superior people to clone infringes
upon their right to procreate-with that claim triggering strict judicial
scrutiny of the cloning law and requiring the state to show a compelling
interest for its action. "' Under this type of judicial scrutiny, at least two
constitutional attacks on the statute itself could be made in addition to
challenging the state's purpose. It is doubtful whether scientific evidence
could provide a rational basis for classification of individuals based on
genetic traits. 18 Moreover, the state may be able to achieve its objective
through a less intrusive program: its interest in the propagation of supe-
rior traits through a positive eugenics program is probably less compel-
ling that its interest in the diminution of inferior traits through a negative
eugenics program.' 19
V. CONCLUSION
It would appear that eugenics enjoys clearly a definite Yin-Yang re-
lationship with genetics; for it does not only have a negative force, but
the threatening potentiality of its unrestrained application is of minor
113. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
114. Lederberg, supra note 101, at 550-52.
115. Id. at 556. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 399 U.S. 618, 638 n.20.
116. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 581-82; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8; U.S. CONST.
amend, XIII.
117. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 556.
118. Id. at 579. See also R. BLANK, supra note 7, at 93-109, 117-22.
119. Vukowich, supra note 10, at 189, 222. If the challenged legislation incorporated negative,
rather than positive, eugenic concepts so that it only restricted carriers of recessive debilitating de-
fects from cloning, the constitutional problems would be minimized. The legitimacy of the state
interest could not be challenged on the ground that it creates an elite group and therefore violates the
nobility clause of the United States Constitution. A court could find readily that such a statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest- specifically, diminishing the propagation of inferior
traits. Scientific evidence more readily can provide a rational basis for the classification of those
carrying debilitating effects than for those possessing superior genetic traits. Whether the state's
interest in a negative eugenics program is sufficiently compelling to sustain the validity of the statute
under a strict scrutiny test, however, is uncertain. Id. at 198-201, 208.
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consequence when the positive sequence of its potential contributions is
both appreciated and utilized. The dynamic vectors of force seen in the
application of modern eugenics through efforts of genetic advancement
and "engineering" must be restrained and placed in equilibrium in order
to alleviate fears of unbridled slippery slopes of scientific advancement
pursued blindly.120 Viewed as not only an aid to the tragedy of infertility
in family planning, but as a tool for enhancing the health of the future
members of society, vital research and experimentation must continue
apace in eugenics and genetics. To attempt to sever one from the other
assures an impotent, as opposed to a virile, response to both the challenge
and the mystery of amazing development of the new reproductive
biology. 121
Controlled breeding through genetic manipulation is not far behind
the legalization of artificial insemination. Once public acceptance of
AID is achieved, rapid progress will be made in achieving similar recog-
nition of other new reproductive techniques. The law will then be in a
better posture to chart a course of action and keep pace with science
instead of remaining behind in grappling with the scientific, legal, ethical,
and social issues in the Brave New World. Although assertions are made
that eugenic control is not only dangerous and foolhardy but destructive
of the integrity of the basic family unit as well as violative of the human
right to determine the size of the family unit, the unalterable fact is that
population forecasts indicate that the world will soon be overpopulated if
appropriate actions are not explored and undertaken. Genetic planning
and screening as well as eugenic programming are more rational and hu-
mane alternatives to regulation of the population than premature death,
famine and war. 122
If we approach mastery of the genetic code with a careful resolve to
minimize human suffering and maximize the social good (or the mainte-
nance of health and prevention of disease), we will approach the future
with assurance that, as Daedalus, we will in fact arrive safely and meet
our goal. If we set out with reckless abandon and are driven by blind
instinct, we will surely be corrupted and, as Icarus, fall. 123
120. See Nossal, The Impact of Genetic Engineering on Modern Medicine, QUADRANT, Nov.
1983, at 22. Smith, Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase, 41 THE PHAROS 10 (1978).
121. McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 461 (1983); Comment, Governmental Control of Research in Positive Eugenics, 7 MICH. J. LAW
REF. 615 (1974).
122. Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709
(1984).
123. G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 164, 165 (1981). See generally Smith, Intru-
sions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and the New Biology, 3 PACE U.L. REV. 63 (1982).
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